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THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE*

Wendell Berget

T

HE recently published Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 1 is now before the bench and bar for discussion. The rules proposed are, of course, tentative. Following a procedure similar to that adopted in the case of the civil rules a few years
ago, they have been printed and distributed by the Advisory Committee
at this stage for the purpose of obtaining criticisms and suggestions.
Some of the rules merely restate existing law as provided by statute
or adopted by general agreement in judicial decisions. Others work
substantial procedural changes. How is the product to be judged?
The need for uniform rules. On numerous questions the practice
of various districts and circuits is in conflict. Existing legislation is
fragmentary, and has not been periodically revised in any systematic
way to conform to experience. As late as the last term the Supreme
Court was presented with questions concerning procedural problems
relating to such basic matters as representation by counsel in Adams v.
United States ex rel McCann; 2 detention and interrogation of suspects
in McNabb v. United States and Anderson v. United States; 3 and the
power of courts to correct errors without reference to lapse of time in
Wells v. United States.4 Questions of what is correct federal criminal
practice, at times even difficult for United States Attorneys, must be
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overwhelming for .the occasional practitioner in the federal courts. All
these circumstances suggest the timeliness of an overall reconsideration
of our procedure and the adoption of a set of uniform rules.
Advantages of rule-making by court promulgation of a set of
rules of general application. The highly technical and specialized na:..
· ture of the problems involved hardly recommends the ordinary processes of legislation as a means of rule revision. The legislative process
.to date has not produced a comprehensive set of rules. To a limited ,
extent, the courts declare new rules through judicial decision. But the
judicial process as exercised in particular cases is necessarily limited to
dealing with specific situations as they chance to arise. In many instances, as in the McNabb and Anderson cases,5 judicial declaration of
a rule in a particular case has the disadvantage of retroactive effect,
with unfortunate consequences to cases already pending in courts where
law enforcement officers acted in good faith and according to processes
which they believed to be legal. The method of judicial promulgation
of rules of general application, prospective in operation, is free from ,
these shortcomings. The particular procedure here adopted insures the
maximum participation of the bench and bar generally, yet it insures
the final participation and approval of the Supreme Court and of Congress.
Scope. The proposed rules govern all criminal proceedings in the
federal courts, with the few exceptions set for~h in Rule 50, and so
constitute a comprehensive code of criminal procedure. As in the·case
of the civil rules, questions of evidence have been deemed within the
scope of the Court's rule-making power, and consequently within the
scope of the committee's assignment. Rule 24, which provides in general that questions of evidence shall be governed, except when an act
of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States, is designed
to codify the principle of Funk v. United States and Wolfe v. United
States.6 :Various other rules have been included, dealing with specific
evidentiary questions. The committee has not, however, formulated a
complete code of evidence. It was probably felt that most of the rules of
evidence should be the same for criminal and civil proceedings.
·This article will be eonfined to a discussion of those features of the
draft which appear to the writer to be of chief significance, following
in gen~ral the same order and arrangement as that adopted in the draft.
The first group of specific rules, following. Rules I and 2 which relate
5
6

See note 3, supra.
290 U.S. 371, 54 S. Ct. 212 (1933); 291 U.S. 7, 54 S. Ct. 279 (1933).
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to general scope, purpose and construction, would govern preliminary
proceedings.
PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS

Rule 3. The complaint. Rule 3 simply provides that the complaint
shall be a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged, made upon oath or affirmation before a commissioner, and
filed with him. The statute 7 provides that persons may be arrested and
imprisoned "agreeably to the usual mode of process" of the state in
which the proceedings are held. A diversity of practice has therefore
developed. Some states do not require that the complaint be in writing,
while others do so require. Some states permit the complaint to be
made on information and belief, while others require personal knowledge. This rule would secure uniformity with respect to the requirement that the complaint be in writing, but local requirements would
continue to govern the question whether it may be based on information and belief.
It has been suggested that this rule operates too restrictively, in that
it sometimes happens that no commissioner is available, and that the
rule ought to permit the filing of complaints before any justice or judge
of the United States. There is merit to this suggestion.· But it might
also be considered whether the statutory provision permitting com•
plaints to be filed with certain state and local officials should not be
eliminated, particularly in view of the new rule of evidence laid down
in McNabb v. United States and Anderson v. United States. 8 Under
present practice state and local officials are seldom used, but if the statutory authority for their use is continued, the McNabb and Anderson cases
will apparently require that defendants be arraigned forthwith before
the nearest official authorized to receive complaints. Obviously, great
confusion may result, and it can readily be argued in almost any case that
commitment could have been made earlier before a different state or
local official. So, particularly because of the McNabb and Anderson
rule, commitment might well be authorized hereafter only before a
definitely stated class of federal officials, but federal justices and judges
might well be included along with commissioners.
Rule 4. Warrant or summons upon complaint. The principal
changes effected' by this rule are as follows:
(I) A summons to a natural defendant may be issued in lieu of a
warrant of arrest. Heretofore the summons has been the established
7

18 U.S. C. § 591 (1940).

8

See note 3, supra.
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method for bringing a corporation into court as a defendant. The adoption of this alternate method of bringing a natural person into court as a
defendant in a criminal proceeding is quite appropriate, and may often
save the government time and expense, and the defendant, in cases
where the crime is not malum in se, unnecessary humiliation. It has
been suggested, however, that the summons procedure should be resorted to only upon the request of the government, and that the words
"or of the complainant" 9 should be eliminated from this rule. There
is much to commend this view.
( 2) More than one warrant or summons for the same defendant
may be issued on a single complaint. This provision meets ~ real need.
It permits more than one enforcement officer to carry a warrant or
summons in looking for a defendant. It also greatly expedites procedure in cases where there are many defendants. Some districts at present permit only one warrant to be issued for all defendants jointly indicted, which gives rise to many difficulties in the execution and return
of such warrants. Some jurisdictions also require that an officer must
have the warrant in his possession to justify arrest .. The complications
arising from these rigid requirements would be alleviated by the rule.
(3) Subdivision ( c) ( 2) provides that a warrant or summons may
be executed or served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state,
or within one hundred miles of the· place where the warrant or summons is issued. This would reduce the number of removal proceedings
necessary. The question naturally arises in regard to cases where execution or service shall be out;ide the state, why draw the line at one
hundred miles from the place of issuance? The answer may well be
that the committee thought the line should be drawn somewhere not
too far away. The rule in this respect may represent a compromise with
sentiment for giving warrants and summonses unlimited territorial effect. Certainly the provision giving warrants and summonses effect
throughout the state is reasonable. There is no practical considerq.tion
affecting rights and liberties of defendants that should operate against
federal warrants and summonses that would not also apply to those
· issued by states, and, of course, similar process issued by a state court
would run throughout the state. If a state warrant issued in New Yark
City can be executed in Buffalo, there seems to be no reason why the
same should not be true of a federal warrant. Likewise, even from the
defendant's viewpoint, there would seem to be no reason why a federal
warrant issued at New Yark and good at Buffalo should not also be
honored in Hoboken or Newark. When it comes• to the question
9

Preliminary Draft 6, line 9.
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whether such a warrant should be allowed as the basis for arrest and
return, without removal proceedings, at Cleveland or Chicago, the considerations are, of course, less clear. The rule does not expressly state
whether the warrant or summons shall be served by an officer from the
district where it was issued, or whether it may be served by an officer
of the district where the accused is found, and I should think that it
should be more specific in this respect.
( 4) Subdivision ( c) (3) provides that an officer executing a warrant need not have it in his possession at the time of the arrest, but that
he shall inform the defendant of the offense with which he is charged
and of the fact that a warrant has been issued, and shall show it to the
defendant as soon thereafter as possible. Although possession of the
warrant is not required by federal law, some state laws contain the requirement and federal practice in some states conforms in this respect to
the state practice. The proposed provision would create in this respect
a uniform federal practice.
(5) Subdivision (c) (4) provides that a warrant returned unexecuted may be kept alive so long as the complaint is pending. This
provision tends toward modernizing practice, and would result in many
instances in obviating the necessity of issuing new warrants.
Rule 5. Procedure upon arrest. Subdivision (a) provides that an
officer making an arrest upon a warrant issued upon a complaint, or any
person making an arrest without a warrant, shall without unnecessary
delay take the person arrested before the nearest available commissioner or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with federal offenses. There are several statutes providing for immediate commitment by arresting officers, and these statutes are cited in the note
following this subdivision.10 These statutes differ in language, but they
seem to mean substantially the same-that persons arrested shall be
taken before a committing officer "immediately" or "forthwith." These
statutes thus prescribe the duties of the arresting officer.
The real controversy comes on subdivision (b), which provides
that no statement made by the defendant in response to questioning by
officers during any period of illegal detention shall be admissible in
evidence against him if the interrogation occurs while the defendant is
held in custody in violation of this rule. This is one of the few rules
which deal with the admissibility of evidence, although in so doing the
objective would seem to be in effect to enforce the procedural requirement with respect to prompt arraignment. It may be granted that the
objective of eliminating abuses of the arresting process is a valid one.
lO

Id.

II-I 2.
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But the question is whether the problem ought to be dealt with through
a rule of admissibility imposed in rules of criminal procedure and, if it
should be so dealt with, whether the present rule does not oversimplify
the problem.
The McNabb and Anderson 11 cases have initiated a general reconsideration of the whole question of interrogation of prisoners by arresting officers. But even under the broadest possjble construction of these
decisions, there are many aspects of the problem which are either not
opened or not involved. They will have to be settled in subsequent
cases or in specific legislation or court rules. May persons in custody
be questioned at all prior to arraignment where arraignment occurs as
promptly as possible? Are statements volunteered to police officers
prior to arraignment admissible? To what extent may there be questioning by arresting officers where arrests are made on holidays or at
times when committing magistrates are actually unavailable? _Are there
special circumstances which may warrant or require that exceptions be
made to the rule of the McNabb and Anderson cases? Can the right
to immediate arraignment be waived by the person in custody{ These
and similar questions are likely to arise in subsequent cases and require
. judicial decision. Certainly, there will have to be a great deal of consideration given these problems in the next few years in order to assure
procedure which guarantees a minimum of official abuse, but which, at
the same time, does not enfeeble the investigatory process.
It is difficult to believe that the McNabb _and Anderson cases say
the final word on this subject. There may be cases where a successful
investigation is absolutely dependent upon immediate interrogation,
or where a short period of detention pending further investigation is
necessary to prevent the escape of confederates, although evidence has
not been sufficiently developed to warrant making formal charges before a commissioner. If exceptions are to be made, how are they to be
limited and what administrative and judicial safeguards can be pro-'
vided?
The solution proposed in Rule 5 (b) is too sweepingly simple. It is
difficult to say what should be the final solution. A formula which will
provide machinery for meeting completely the necessities of adeqate
investigation and the requirements for proper protection of the accused
has yet to be evolved, and probably cannot be ·worked out in time for
presentation to the Supreme Court along with the rest_of these rules.
The several litigation precedents that have arisen since the decision

1

11

See note 3, supra.
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of the McNabb and Anderson cases do not offer much comfort or satisfaction as to the way the new rule would operate. Federal investigatory agencies are encountering real, practical difficulties in applying the
new rule to the investigation of sophisticated criminals. There should
be gener~l agreement that police excesses and abuses in this country
must be stopped, but Rule 5 (b) does not appear to represent the final
solution. It was framed before the decision in the McNabb and Anderson cases. Ultimately, in the light of those cases and of investigatory
experience following them, it may be possible to work out some procedure which would formulate and define limited classes of situations in
which detention and interrogation can be permitted under administrative or judicial safeguards sufficient to insure that civilized methods will
be maintained and that the conditions and judgments with respect to.
detention shall not be left to the uncontrolled discretion of the arresting
officer.
Rule 6. Proceedings before the commissioner. Subdivision (a) protects the right of the defendant to be informed of the complaint against
him, his right to counsel, and his right to have or waive a preliminary
examination. He shall also be informed that any statements made by
him' may be used against him. Provision is made for opportunity to
consult counsel and for admission to bail, as provided in Rule 42. Subdivision (b) provides that the defendant shall not be required to plead.
If he waives examination he shall be held to answer in the district court,
and if he does not waive examination the commissioner shall hear the
evidence within a reasonable time. If hearing is not waived and from
the evidence presented it appears to the commissioner that there is
probable cause, the defendant shall be held to answer in the district
court. This rule appears eminently fair.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION

Rule 7. The grand jury. The next group of rules relates to indictment and information, and includes Rules 7 to ro, inclusive. Subdi-.
vision (a) of Rule 7 authorizes the summoning of grand juries in vacation as well as term time, and also contemplates that more than one
grand jury may serve simultaneously, not only in the district but also
at a particular place of holding court. The number of grand juries
which shall serve at one time is left to the court's discretion. The flexibility which this rule furnishes should greatly add to the effi~iency of
the grand jury system for the volume of criminal work is unevenly distributed around the country. In some districts the government is con-
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stantly pressed to find sufficient grand jury time. In other districts the
grand juries meet only infrequently and then do not have much business to transact.
Subdivision (b) provides that the government, or a defendant who
has been held to answer, may challenge the array on the ground that
the grand jury was not lawfully .selected, drawn or summoned, and
may challenge an individual juror on the ground of disqualification or
bias, but only before the grand jury is sworn. It is further provided
that motions to dismiss the indictment on such grounds must be made
before trial and that no indictment need be dismissed on the ground
that one or more members of the grand jury were not legally qualified
if twelve or more jurors, after deducting the number not l~gally qualified, are found to have concurred in the finding of the in,dictment.
Some questions may be raised about this subdivision. It is difficult
to see why the defendants who have been arrested prior to swearing
in a grand jury should have a right to challenge, whereas defendants
subsequently arrested and held for grand jury action should not have
such right. Since a grand jury may sit for as long as eighteen months
this right of challenge would seem to inure to the benefit of relatively
few defendants. With respect to additional grand jurors impaneled in
place of jurors excused, will a defendant who is being held for grand
jury action at the time have a right to challenge the single juror although he cannot challenge the rest of the jury? Such a right would
seem rather pointless.
But why should defendants be permitted to challenge grand jurors
on the ground of partiality at all? The grand jury does not determine
guilt or innocence. It merely brings charges. The government mu~t
satisfy at least twelve grand jurors before an indictment is returned ..
Granted the occasional bias of several of the jurors, still a substantial
number of impartial grand jurors remain to approve the return of an
indictment. A prosecuting attorney is not legally disqualified from
filing an information by the fact that he may have preconceived notions
of the guilt of the defendant. Why should there be such a disqualification for grand jurors?_
This subdivision also provides for a motion to dismiss the indictment by reason of objections to the array, lack of legal qualification, or
bias of a juror. Presumably such motion would be passed on in advance
of trial and would mean, in effect, that there would be a trial on the
question of partiality of the gr.and jury in advance of the trial of the
indictment. I think this offers abounding opportunities for pettifogging
tactics.

1 943
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Subdivision ( c) requires the appointment of a deputy foreman as
well as a foreman. This provision might well be optional rather than
mandatory. In certain rural districts grand juries customarily do not
remain in session more than a few days at a time, and in such cases there
is ~o particular purpose served in requiring that a deputy foreman be
designated.
Subdivision ( e) relates to secrecy and provides that a juror, attorney, interpreter, clerk or stenographer may disclose matters occurring
before the grand jury only when_ so directed by the court, preliminarily
to or in connection with another judicial proceeding, or when permitted
by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury. It also provides for sealing
the indictment, upon direction of the court. The rule does not apply
to witnesses and the question may well be raised whether witnesses also
should not be brought within the scope of this rule. A further question
arises out of the fact that the rule, read literally, has the effect of preventing a United States Attorney, or other authorized government attorney, from discussing developments before the grand jury with the
Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or other authorized
Department of Justice officials. Such a result was probably not intended, and an appropriate exception ought to be made in the rule to
cover this situation.
Subdivision (g) provides that a grand jury shall serve until discharged and that it need not be discharged until the expiration of
eighteen months. The beginning or expiration of a term of court is to
have no effect on the grand jury's tenure or powers. An individual
juror may be temporarily or permanently excused at any time for cause
and the court may impanel another person in place of a juror permanently excused.
Rule 8. The indictment and information. Subdivision (a) authorizes prosecution by information of non-capital felony cases if indictment
is waived, and that any other non-capital offense may be prosecuted by
either indictment or-information. Subdivision (b) provides that indictment may be waived in writing in all non-capital cases if the defendant
is represented by counsel. These are important and desirable provisions. At present persons unable to furnish bail are often held in jail
for many months pending submission of a case to a grand jury. Most of
these persons would be glad to waive indictment in order to get an immediate trial. If they are not guilty they are entitled to their freedom.
If they are guilty they ought to begin serving their sentences promptly.
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Under present practice the government is put to a great deal of expense in maintaining these persons during the ip.onths they are jailed
prior to indictment, and they, of course, lose precious time which, even
if they are guilty, does not count on their sentence. Pros~cution by information, where the defendant waives indictment, is certainly to be
commended in non-capital felony cases. The language of this rule
might be improved by requiring that the accused shall be informed of
his. constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment, and that it shall
appear in the record that the defendant was so informed. It might also
be required that the waiver of indictment be physically annexed to the
information.
Perhaps consideration should also be given to the question
whether some provision should be made to permit waiver by those
defendants who do not desire to be represented by counsel. In many
cases defendants desire to plead and be sentenced and get it all over
with, and often these defendants do not want counsel. If adequate provision is made in the rule for informing the defendants of their constitutional rights, waiver of indictment could safely be allowed where
counsel is not desired.
Subdivision ( c) provides that the information shall be signed by the
attorney for the government and may be filed only by leave of court.
Should not the government have the final say as to whether or not an
information shall be filed? This could be accomplished by eliminating
the clause "and may be filed only by leave of court." 12
Subdivision ( d) provides for simplification of the form of indictments and informations and states that the indictment need not contain
any formal commencement,· formal conclusion or other matter not
necessary to a plain, concise statement of the essential facts. Excellent
sample forms are found in the appendix to the rules.18 Indictments
have traditionally been encumbered with anachronistic and verbose
allegations ·and redundant repetitions. The suggested forms eliminate
all this. They are simple and unadorned pleadings which contain only
the essential information necessary to notify the defendant of the charge
against him.
Subdivision ( e) authorizes the striking of surplusage from indictments or informations. It has been held that surplusage. cannot be
stricken from an indictment without the consent of the defendant. But
if the defendant is-going to have the power to waive indictment alto12
18

Preliminary Draft 28, line I 8.
Id. 218-223.
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gether, he certainly should have the power to consent to the striking
out of surplusage, or to move to have it stricken.
Rule 9. Joinder of offenses and defendants. This rule covers
joinder of offenses and defendants. Sub,division (a) relates to joinder
of offenses and states substantially the present federal law. Subdivision
(b) provides for joinder of defendants who are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or
transactions, constituting or resulting in an offense or offenses. There is
no statute on joinder of defendants but federal decisions have permitted joinder under circumstances similar to those set out in the rule.
Rule IO. Warrant or summons upon indictment or information.
This rule embodies provisions substantially like those in Rule 4 relating to warrant or summons upon complaint. Probably the m9st
notable provision is that of subdivision (a) to the effect that when an
indictment or information is filed, a warrant for the arrest of each defendant not in custody shall be issued by the clerk as a matter of course,
unless otherwise directed by the court or these rules. This makes unnecessary an order of court for the issuance of a warrant. The summons
procedure is made applicable here, as in Rule 4, except that it is provided that the summons shall be issued upon request of the government
or by direction of the court. A summons to a corporation under this
rule may be served within such distance as the court may order and
could, therefore, run throughout the United States.
ARRAIGNMENT AND PREPARATION FOR TRIAL

Rule I I. Arraignment. We come now to the provisions for arraignment and preparation for trial. These are found in Rules r r-20.
Rule I I provides that arraignment shall be in open court, and that the
indictment or information shall be read to the defendant or its substance
stated to him. He shall be advised that he is entitled to a copy of the
indictment or information, and if he requests it, a copy shall be given to
him before he is called upon to plead. It has been suggested that Rule
I I be amended to require that the defendant be required to plead in
writing.14 Having a written plea in the record would probably avoid
confusion and subsequent habeas corpus proceedings where the plea
may be challenged on the ground the prisoner did not understand it
or did not in fact plead guilty.
It has also been suggested that the provision authorizing the stating
of the substance of the indictment can lead to differences of opinion as
14

Id. 46, line 5.
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to whether or not the substance was actually given to the defendant,
and that it would be better to provide merely for the reading of the indictment or information unless the defendant waives such reading. In
the case of long and complicated indictments the judge very likely has
not had opportunity to analyze the indictment sufficiently to state fully
its substance to the defendant, and it would probably be better to require reading in the absence of waiver. In any event, the defendant
gets a copy of the indictment or information if he wants it.
Rule I3. Pleadings and motions; defenses and objections., Subdivision (a) abolishes demurrers, motions to quash, pleas in abatement
and pleas in bar. The defenses and objections heretofore raised by
these forms are to be raised only by motion to dismiss, or for other appropriate relief.
This simplification is certainly commendable and should eliminate
a lot of confusion. Under this rule any matter of defense or objection
capable of determination before the trial of the general issue may be
raised before trial by a motion. When a motion before trial raises
an issue of fact, the defendant is entitled to trial by jury if the issue
is one which heretofore might have been raised at the trial under a
plea of not guilty. All other issues· of fact raised by motion before trial
may be tried with or without a jury, or on affidavits, or in such other
manner as the court directs. The court may determine the motion or
may order that the defenses or objections raised be submitted for determination at the trial of the general issue.
Rule I 4. Relief from prejut/,icial joinder. This rule seems to state
substantially the present federal law and does not appear to present
anything controversial. Possibly, the rule extends the present law in
that it appears that relief from prejudicial joinder can be granted at
any time, even during trial, prior to verdict. This rule suggests the
question whether severance after trial has started would prevent retrial
of the defendant severed on ground of double jeopardy.
Rule I5. Trial together of indictments or informations. This rule
authorizes the trial together of indictments or informations if the offenses and the defendants could hav~ been joined in a single indictment or information.
Rule I6. Pre-trial procedure. At any time after the filing of an
indictment or information the court may invite the attorneys to appear
before it for a conference, at which the defendant shall have the right
to be present to consider (I) the simplification of the issues, ( 2) the
possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will
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avoid unnecessary proof, (3) the number of expert witnesses or character witnesses or other witnesses who are to give testimony of a cumulative nature, and ( 4) such other matters as may be related to the
disposition of the proceeding. The court shall make an order which recites the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered. The orders entered at the pre-trial conferences control the
subsequent course of the proceeding, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. This rule shall not be invoked in the case of any
defendant who is not represented by counsel.
Already this pre-trial procedure has been employed to great advantage in many districts. It has been criticized to some extent by
prosecuting attorneys as providing a fishing expedition for the defendant, and by defense attorneys as constituting a means of coercing concessipns and stipulations to which the defendant would not otherwise
agree. But in one form or another pre-trial conferences have been held
in criminal cases all through the ages, even though they were not expressly labeled as such. The technique should be recognized and encouraged, as it provides a method that can be useful in many cases in
disposing of time-consuming routine matters in advance of trial and in
narrowing the issues, the number of witnesses and volume of evidence
introduced at the trial.
Rule I7- Alibi notice. This rule provides that the government may
serve upon the defendant a reasonable time before the trial a notice
specifying precisely the contention of the government as to the time
and place where the defendant committed the offense charged. If the
defendant intends to introduce evidence that he was at a place other
than that specified, he shall within a reasonable time serve upon the
government a statement specifying the place where he claims to have
been. Neither side thereafter shall be permitted to introduce evidence
inconsistent with its specification unless the court for good cause permits
the specification to be amended. If a defendant fails to make the specification required by this rule, the court shall exclude evidence in his
behalf that he was at a place other than that specified by the government.
The practice of providing for advance notice of alibi by the defendant has already been adopted in fourteen states but is new in
federal practice. The various state provisions differ in detail and they
are very well summarized by a chart in the printed rules.15 One of the
important points of difference in these provisions is whether the prose15

Id. 96-97.
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cution shall be required to take the first step by requesting notice from
the defendant if he intends to offer alibi evidence. Only three states;
Minnesota, New Jersey and New York, require the prosecution to
take the first step, but that procedure has been adopted in the proposed
rule. Many of our United States Atto~neys would go further and place
on the defendant the burden of coming forward with notice of an alibi
if he intends to prove one~ But defendant or counsel might sometimes
be ignorant of their burden in this regard and thereby lose, by failure to
give notice, their right to introduce alibi evidence. Probably the rule
should be adopted with the provision that the government shall invoke
its application.
A number of these rules, and this one in particular, are to be
commended for their tendency to reduce the element of surprise in
criminal cases. Criminal trials should not be regarded as sporting
games -in which the adversaries have secret plays which they may
properly conceal until some dramatic moment. Excitement for participants or spectators' is not the goal of a criminal trial. We should move
in the direction of more affirmative pleading wherever possible. There
is still a long way to go in this direction, considering the considerable
variety of defenses now available ·under the relatively noncommittal
plea of not guilty. The alibi notjce provision is a step in this direction
but only with reference to one particular defense. Is the element of
surprise any less with reference to other defenses?
.
Rule r8. Depositions. Subdivision (a) authorizes the court at any
time after the filing of an indictment or information to order that the
testimony of any witness ( either for the government or the defendant)
be taken, by deposition if it appears that subsequently he may be unavailable. The court may ·also direct that the testimony of a material
witness who has been committed for failure to give bail shall be taken
by deposition, after which the court may discharge the witness from
custody.
Subdivision (b) makes provision for the payment of reasonable
expenses of the defe~dant and his attorney where the defendant, at
whose instance a deposition is to be taken, cannot bear the expense.
Subdivision ( c) provides for production of the defendant at an
examination of a witness whose deposition is being taken at the instance
of the government, and provides for payment in advance of travel and
subsistence expenses to the defendant's attorney and to a defendafit
not in custody, where a deposition is taken. at the instance of the government.

1 943]

FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULES

Subdivision ( p.) provides that where the witness is unavailable, the
depositions may be used at the trial or other hearing so far as otherwise
admissible under the rules of evidence, or to contradict or impeach the
testimony of the deponent as a witness.
Subdivision ( e) provides that objections to receiving depositions in
evidence may be made as provided in civil actions.
Subdivision ( f) provides that where a deposition is taken at the
instance of the defendant the court may, upon the defendant's request,
direct that it be taken on written interrogatories. ·
The principal change in Rule r 8, of course, is the provision that
depositions may be taken at the instance of the government. The possible objection that this provision violates the right of confrontation
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is met by providing for the presence of the defendant when the deposition is taken. This rule should
serve a particularly useful function in the case of necessary witnesses
who have been committed under 28 United States Code, section 657 or
659, because of inability to give bond. Such witnesses may be discharged from custody as soon as their depositions have been taken. No
doubt the use of depositions by the government in criminal cases will
necessarily be limited, but the rule should be helpful in some cases.
Rule z9. Discovery and inspection. This rule would authorize the
court to order the attorney for the government to permit inspection
before trial by the defense of books, papers, documents, or tangible
objects. The only restrictions are that the matter sought should not be
privileged, that it be shown to be material to the preparation of the
defense, that the request be reasonable, and that the request be made
after the filing of the indictment or information and after the defendant
has been taken into custody. Beyond this the rule would leave the
entire matter to the discretion of the court.
'
There is some precedent in federal practice for pre-trial disclosure
of this kind, as the note in the rule indicates.16 But the instances have
been relatively few. It is consequently difficult to foresee just how this
rule wo1:}ld be interpreted in practice. A strong case for disclosure can
obviously be made out where the matter sought is an object which is
itself evidence to be used as a basis for expert testimony. Questioned
documents, fingerprint and ballistic exhibits, and the like would fall
into this category. Beyond this we move into less well charted ground.
Under the heading of papers and documents we will have to deal with
is

Id. 103.
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a great variety of material raising a variety of problems. Should the
defendant ever be permitted to inspect statements of witnesses before
trial? Should he be permitted to inspect the statement or confession of
a co-defendant? Should he ever be permitted to inspect the minutes of
a grand jury, pr the transcript of an administrative investigatory hearing? It is stated in the note that the rule does not provide for the
inspection of grand jury minutes, but there is nothing in the rule
which expressly precludes this. The rule requires a showing that items
sought are material to the preparation of the defense. This is broad
enough to includejtems which would not be admissible evidence at the
trial. Should not disclosure be limited to material evidence?
The answers to questions such as these involve decisions on broad
policy. As the note indicates, the prevailing policy has been to grant
disclosures of these kinds very sparingly if at all. If no change in that
policy is contemplated the rule is misleadingly broad in its language.
If, change is contemplated, a more definite indication of policy in the
rule, or at least in the note, would be helpful. As it now stands, an
extreme diversity of practice might well develop. Should not limitations, at least with' respect to statements of witnesses, memoranda and
notes of the prosecutor, and grand jury minutes, be written into the
rule?
Rule 20. Subpoenas. This rule makes one significant change in
practice. Subdivision (b) provides that the court in its discretion may
direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in a subpoena
duces tecum be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial,
or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence, and may,
upon their production, permit the books, papers, documents, objects, or
portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys. The
note states 17 that this provision has b~n inserted in the interests of fairness and for the purpose of preventing delay during the trial, particularly in cases where numerous documents may have been subpoenaed.
This again is a provision that tends to reduce the element of surprise,
and its proper use ought to facilitate the trial ·of cases.
TRIAL

Rule 2 I. Trial by jury or by the court. The next section of the
rules is devoted to trial and includes Rules 2r-29. Rule 2r expressly
authorizes waiver of jury trial by the defendant, and requires that it
17

Id. 107-108.
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be in writing, with the approval of the court and the consent of the
government. It also provides that the trial may be by a jury of less than
twelve, where so stipulated with the approval of the court. Where the
defendant is found guilty in a trial without a jury the judge "may in
addition find the facts specially or file an opinion instead of such special
findings." As a practical matter, there probably will be few cases in
which defendants will consent to a trial by a jury of less than twelve.
The question may well be asked whether court rules are the proper
place to provide for reducing the size of the jury. As a practical matter, how:ever, the question is probably not of great importance.
Rule 22. Trial jurors. The chief features and changes provided by
this rule may be summarized as follows:
( r) Provision is made that the court may permit counsel to conduct the examination, or may itself conduct the examination, but in the
latter event the court shall permit counsel to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself put additiorial questions submitted by counsel.
•
( 2) If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is
entitled to twenty peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, each side is entitled to six peremptory challenges; but, if there is more than one
defendant, the defendants jointly are entitled to ten peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for not
more than one year, or by fine, or both, each side is entitled to three
peremptory challenges; but, if there is more than one defendant, the
defendants jointly are entitled to six peremptory challenges.
As many as four alternate jurors may be impaneled in both felony
and misdemeanor cases. An alternate juror who does not replace a
regular juror before the jury retires shall not retire with the jury, but
shall remain under order of the court and shall not be discharged until
the jury is discharged. If at any time prior to the return of the verdict
a juror· dies or becomes ill or otherwise unable to perform his duty,
the court may order him to be discharged and may order an alternate
juror, in the order in which he was impaneled, to take the place of the
juror discharged. Provision is also made for peremptory challenges of
alternate jurors.
There seems to be great sentiment among United States Attorneys
for providing unconditionally that the examination shall be conducted
by the court, with provision that the examination may be supplemented
by questions submitted by the parties. It is believed that in most in-
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stances the court could more fairly conduct the examination, and that
the pr9cedure of having the court do so would save time.
It is to be noted that the rule specifically provides that the alternate
jurors shall not be discharged when the jury retires to deliberate, but
shall be held under order of court until the jury is discharged. This
procedure will meet the contingency which sqmetimes arises when a
regular juror becomes incapacitated after the jury begins its delibera- '
tions.
·
Rule 24. Evidence. This rule provides that the admissibility of
evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide,
by the principles of common law as interpreted by the courts of the
United States. Adoption of the principle of uniformity in regard to the
rules of evidence in federal criminal cases should be welcomed.
The principle has been sanctioned in Funk v. United States and
W olfte v. United States.18 This rule goes much further in adopting the
uniformity principle than the corresponding civil rule (Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 43 (a) ) ,1<J which provides, among other
things, that evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the
rules of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the
state in which the United States court is held. We now have a body of
adjudicated rules of evidence in the federal courts, and there is no reason .
why these rules should not be uniform over the entire country.
Rule 25. Proof of official record. This rule merely incorporates by
reference Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides a uniform method of proving public records and entry or lack of
entry. All statutes providing a method of proof of official records remain in force, and proof may be made either according to their_ pro, visions or according to this rule. ·
·
Rule 26. Expert witnesses. This rule provides that the court may
order the de~endant or the government to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request both parties to submit
nominations. The co~rt shall appoint any expert witness agreed upon
by the parties, and if they do not agree the court,may appoint witnesses
of its own selection. At the trial an expert witness may be called by the
court or. by either party, and shall be subject to cross-examination by
each party.
•

18
19

See note 6, supra.
Published, among other places, in U. S. C. (1940), following title 28, § 723 c.
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Rule 27. Motion for acquittal. The chief features and changes
made by this rule are as follows:
( r) The motion for a directed verdict is abolished and motion for
a judgment of acquittal is to be used in its place.
( 2) If a motion for judgment of acquittal is made at the close of
all the evidence, the court may reserve decision on the motion, submit
the case to the jury and decide the motion either before the jury has
returned a verdict or after it has returned a verdict of guilty, or has
been discharged without having returned a verdict. If the motion is
denied and the case submitted to the jury, the motion may be r~newed
within ten days after the jury is discharged. It may include in the alternative a motion for a new trial.
There is much to be said for the view that after a verdict of guilty
the court should not on questions of fact have authority to do anything
but grant a new trial. It may be that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain the verdict, but perhaps on a retrial the government would have
additional evidence. However, the practice provided in this rule has
been upheld in United States v. Stone,2° affirming (by an equally
divided court) Ex parte United States,21 and is not greatly different in
effect from the old judgment non obstante veredicto.
Rule 28. Instructions. This rule is patterned on Rule 5r of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It provides that at-the close of the
evidence, unless further time is granted, any party may :file written
requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the
requests. Copies shall be furnished to the adverse parties. The court
shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to
their arguments to the jury, but the court shall instruct the jury after
the arguments are completed. No party may assign as error any portion
of the charge or omission therefrom, unless he objects before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to
make the objection out of hearing of the jury. The provision for exchange of copies of requested instructions will enable the government
more effectively to assist the court and obviate error when a proper or
necessary instruction requested by the defense has been omitted through
inadvertence.
Rule 29. Verdict. This rule permits a verdict by a stated majority
of the jurors on stipulation, with the approval of the court. There is no
20

21

308 U.S. 519, 60 S. Ct. 177 (1939).
(C: C. A. 7th, 1939) IOI F. (2d) 870.
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express provision for special verdicts or findings, and it has been suggested that provision should be made in these rules for special verdicts
and special findings in cases where more than a single offense is involved, on the analogy of the rules of civil procedure. Apart from this,
the rule embodies substantially the present law.
JUDGMENT

Rule 30. Sentence and judgment. The next group of rules relates
to judgment and consists of Rules 30 and 31. The most significant features of Rule 30 relate to the pre-sentence investigation. Subdivision
( c) ( r) requires the probation service of the court to make a presentence investigation and report before the imposition of sentence or
the granting of probation, unless the court otherwise directs. This investigation is to be made after determination of the question of guilt,
unless the defendant consents in writing that it pe made earlier. Under
present law the probation officer investigates cases only when they are
referred to him, and the law does not prescribe the scope of the presentence investigation. The proposed rule in subdivision ( c) ( 2) contemplates that the report will present a thorough social case history of
the defendant, such as may be of aid in imposing sentence, granting
probation or providing for correctional treatment. ·
No doubt much more remains to be done to modernize our laws and
procedure with reference to the correctional treatment of criminals.
The Federal Corrections Act, recommended by Judge Parker's committee, carries this program much farther. But at least the proposed
rule is in line with the modern trend and is a step in the right direction.
Subdivision ( c) ( 2) also provides that after determination of the
question of guilt the rel?ort shall be available to the attorneys for the
parties, and to such persons or agencies having a legitimate interest
therein as the court may designate, and upon such conditions as the
court may impose. There is a substantial difference of opinion as to
whether the probation reports should be treated.as confidential. It has
been argued that probation officers will not be able to obtain information with respect to defendants unless they can assure their informers
that the information will be treated as strictly confidential. For example, information may have to be obtained from a defendant's wife,
.and the subsequent revelation of such information might well be the
cause of marital strife. Where a report reflects an incurable mental disorder, disclosure to the defendant may mean serious psychic trauma.
Certainly it seems that there is much to be said for striking the clause
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that would authorize disclosure of the report "to such other persons
or agencies having a legitimate interest therein." Whether the report
should be made available to attorneys for the parties seems to me to
present a close question.
Rule 3 I. Relief from judgment or order. The principal changes
in this rule are:
( r) Subdivision (a) permits the correction of errors in the record
"arising from oversight and omission" at any time. Disabilities resulting from the expiration of a term of court are thus removed.
( 2) Subdivision (b) provides that the court may reduce a sentence
without regard to whether the term has expired, upon motion made
within sixty days after sentence, or within sixty days after receipt by the
district court of a mandate upon affirmance, or within sixty days after
the receipt of an order of the Supreme Court denying an application
for writ of certiorari.
(3) Subdivision ( c) provides that a motion for a new trial based
solely upon the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made
at any time before or after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending
the court can grant the motion only on remand of the case. A motion
based solely upon grounds other than newly discovered evidence must
be made within three days after verdict, or finding of guilty, or within
such further time as the court may fix during the three-day period.
(4) Subdivision ( d) provides that the court may arrest judgment
if the indictment or information does not charge an offense, or if the
court was without jurisdiction of the offense charged. The motion in
arrest shall be made within three days after verdict, or finding of guilty,
or within such further time as the court may fix during the three-day
period.
.
Subdivision (b) has been criticized on the ground that it will submit
judges to continual applications for reduction of sentence. It appears
reasonable to extend the power of a judge to reduce a sentence imposed
after a trial held near the end of a term, and, on the other hand, to put
a limit on the reduction of sentence in cases where the term will run for
an extended time following sentence.
The rule certainly recognizes and extends the tendency to do away
with the significance of the term of court. It makes no express provision
for relief comparable to that available under the common law writ of
error coram nobis, which permitted reopening of a judgment at any
time to consider allegations of e~ror of fact not apparent on the face of
the record. However, the note expressly states that nothing in the rule
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limits existing power of the court to grant any type of relief from judgments or orders riot expressly provided for in the rule. The Supreme
Court has not finally determined whether relief comparable to the
common law writ of coram nobis is available in federal criminal cases.
SUPPLEMENTARY AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Rule 3 2. Removal. The next group of rules relates 'to supplemental and special proceedings and includes Rules 32-34. The most
important fea~es of Rule 32 are:
(I) It provides that only a defendant found in a district in another
state a hundred miles or more from the place where the warrant was
issued need be removed. This conforms to the modifications with respect to execution and service of warrants and summonses, provided in
· Rules 4 and IO.
{ 2) Where a certified copy of an indictment is produced it need be
supplemented only by proof of identity, and where a certified copy of
an information or complaint is relied on it must be supplemented by
proof of identity and of probable cause.
Serious consideration might be given to the question whether it is
desirable to hold preliminary removal hearings before a commissioner.
This is the present system, but in practice it has developed into two
hearings; one before the commissioner, and another before the judge.
It might save time for everybody if the rule should provide that if a
defendant does not waive a hearing, such hearing shall be held forthwith before a judge.
.
The provision that when prosecution is by indictment removal shall
be ordered upon production of a certified copy of the indictment and
proof of identity is especially commendable. As is well known, the
practice .has developed in some districts of practically trying the case
on the merits before Qrdering removal. But where a grand jury of
another district has regularly returned an indictment, and the identity
of the defendant is established to the satisfaction of the court where he.
is found, removal should automatically follow. Where prosecution is
by information, it seems appropriate to require a showing of probable
cause, but even then the court should not require more than a showing
of probable cause.
Rule 33. Search and seizure. This rule is substantially similar to
existing legislation dealing generally with search warrants. It expressly
provides that property subject to confiscation will not be returned even
in cases of unlawful search, and makes explicit the present practice of
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suppressing illegally obtained evidence. Provision is also made for
review by the district court of decisions by a commissioner or judge
concerning the return of property or the suppression of ·evidence. The
rule would not supersede the numerous statutes dealing with search
and seizure in particular types of cases or under particular circumstances.
In subdivision ( e), relating to the motion for return of seized property and to suppress evidence, it is provided that the hearing on such
motion may be held by the judge or commissioner. While provision
is made for review by the district court of any decision by a commissioner, there is a question whether the matters presented by such motion
should be heard by commissioners. These questions involve vital constitutional rights a-nd often pr~ent difficult legal questions within the
competence of a judge only to determine. It may therefore be suggested that such motions should be heard by district judges only, and
that the rule should be amended in this respect.
Rule 3 4. Criminal contempt. This rule substantially restates the
existing law on criminal contempt in so far as the right to notice and
hearing and the right to jury trial are concerned. In cases of summary
punishment without notice or hearing, the judge is to certify that he
saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt, and that it was
committed in the actual presence of the court. In cases where the proceeding is by notice and hearing, the notice shall state the essential facts
constituting the alleged criminal contempt, and describe it as such.
When the alleged contempt consists of disrespect to or criticism of a
judge, that judge shall be disqualified from presiding at the, trial or
hearing except with the defendant's consent.
This rule, in e:ffect, covers proceedings where a defendant is not ·
entitled to a trial by jury under the doctrine of Nye v. United States.22
APPEAL

Rule 35. Taking appeal and petition for writ of certiorari. The
next group of rules covers the subject of appeal and includes Rules 3537, inclusive. The principal changes made by Rule 35 are:
(I) In subdivision (a) (I) petitions for allowance of appeal, citations, and assignments of error are abolished, and it is provided that
the notice of appeal shall set forth all of the essential matters. A juris22

313 U.S. 33, 61 S. Ct. 810 (1941).
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dictional statement is required, as at present, where the appeal is made
directly to the Supreme Court.
(2) Subdivision (a) (2) provides that an appeal by a defendant
may be taken within ten days after the entry of the judgment or order :
_appealed from. But if a motion for a new trial has been seasonably
made, ·an appeal from a judgment or conviction may be taken within
ten days after the entry of the order denying the motion. Thus, the
time for a defenda_nt to appeal is enlarged from five to ten days. Appeals by the government must be taken within the thirty-day period
now prescribed by statute.
(3) Petition for writ of certiorari shall be made within thirty days
after entry of the judgment, or within such further time, not exceeding
thirty days, as the court or a justice thereof may fix.
Rule 36. Stay of execution and relief pending review. The principal points here involved are:
(I) Subdivision (a) (I) provides that a sentence of death shall be
stayed if an appeal is taken.
( 2) Subdivision (a) ( 2) provides that ·a sentence of imprisonment
shall be stayed if an appeal is taken and the defendant elects with the
approval of the court to remain in detention pending appeal, or is admitted to bail. The effect of this is to require that an affirmative step
be taken by the defendant if he desires a stay.
It has been suggested that the rule should be amended so that.if the
conviction is affirmed the defendant shall get credit on his sentence for
all time spent in jail, i.rrespective of 'whether he elected to commence
serving his sentence prior to affirmance. Such amendment would apply
where ·the defendant elects to remain in detention during appeal and
ultimately loses his appeal.
Subdivision ( c) provides that if application is made to the circuit
court of appeals, a circuit judge or a justice of the Supreme Court for
bail, or for extension of time for docketing the record, or for any other
relief which might have been granted by the district court, the application shall be upon notice, and shall show that application to the district court is not practicable, or has been made and denied, with the
reasons given for the denial, or that the action of the district court on
the application did not afford the relief to which the applicant considers he is entitled.
Rule 37. Supervision of the appeal by the appellate court. Subdivision (b} (I) provides that the rules of practice governing preparation
and form of record on appeal in civil cases shall apply to the record
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on appeal in criminal proceedings, which means that a bill of exceptions
is no longer required.
Subdivision (b) ( 2) provides that it shall not be necessary to print
the record on appeal except that the appellant shall print as an appendix
to his brief the judgment appealed from, any opinion or charge of the
court, and such other parts of the record material to the questions presented as the appellant desires the court to read. The brief of the appellee shall contain as an appendix such parts of the record as the
appellee desires the court to read which have not been printed in the
appellant's brief, arid the appellant may set forth in an appendix to a
reply brief such additional parts as he desires the court to read, in view
of the appellee's brief. If the appellate court th.inks the appellant has
failed to print as much of the record as adequately presents the questions raised by him, it may impose as costs the expense incurred by appellee in printing the omitted matter.
It is provided in other subdivisions of this rule that the circuit court
of appeals may dispense with the printing of the record and review the
proceedings on the typewritten record, and appropriate provisions are
made for docketing the appeal, summary disposition for nonpayment of
fees, and setting the appeal for argument.
The provision eliminating the necessity of printing the record on
appeal in a separate volume embodies the practice which has been
adopted in several circuits, and there found satisfactory. A minority of
the Advisory Committee criticized the practice on the ground that it
does not provide for a continuous printed record, and suggested that
this objection could be overcome by providing that the appellant and
appellee should in turn designate the portions of the record on which
they rely, all of which should be printed in continuous form in a single
volume.
Some of the circuit judges in western circuits covering many states
and sparsely populated territory have objected that the local printing
service is inadequate in many localities where the parties live, and that
the printing of the appendices could not be done to the satisfaction of
the court by these local printers, whereas the court's contract printer
can do a much better job. Conceivably, the situation in this regard may
be very different, for example, in the Tenth Circuit than it would be in
the Third.
There is some question whether this matter of how the record shall
be printed should be the subject of an enforced uniform practice
throughout the country, or whether each circuit should be left free to
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deal with it as local printing and other conditions may dictate. The
present rule does not in terms make the practice now used in the Third
and a few other circuits mandatory on all, although it strongly suggests that a uniform practice is desirable.
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 38. Presence of defendant. The last group of rules contains
various general provisions and includes Ruies 38-56. Rule 38 clarifies
the law concerning the stages of a proceeding at which a defendant
is entitled to be present, and those at which he must be present. It
provides inter alia:
,
(I) In all non-capital cases the defendant's voluntary absence after
the trial has commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the
trial and,including the return of the verdict.
( 2) A corporation may appear· by .counsel for all purposes.
(3) In misdemeanor cases the court may, with the written consent
of the defendant that counsel shall act for him, permit arraignment to
be had and a plea of not guilty to be entered, or the trial to be conducted in the absence of the defendant.
Rule 39. Counsel for the defendant. This rule simply provides that ,
'if the defendant appears in court without counsel the court shall advise
him of his right and assign counsel to represent him, unless he requests
to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel of his own choice.
Rule 40. Place of trial. The principal changes in this rule are:
(I) In a district containing more than one division arraignment
may be had, a plea accepted and the trial conducted or sentence imposed, if the defendant consents, in a_ny division of the district and at
any time.
( 2) Where a defendant is arrested in a district other than the one
in which the indictment or information is pending, and desires to plead
guilty or nolo contendere, he may, .if represented by counsel, consent
to and have his case disposed of in the district. in which he is arrested,
subject to the approval of the United States Attorney for each district.
These two provisions should result in a very considerable saving
of time and in greater :flexibility of administration, especially in districts.
where terms of coutt are few and far between.
(3) On motion of the defendant the court may transfer a proceeding to. another district or .division if (a) there exists in the district or
division where the prosecution is commenced so great a prejudice
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against the defendant that he cannot there obtain a fair and impartial
trial; or (b) the indictment or information alleges an offense committed
in more than one district or division, and in the interest of justice the
proceeding should be transferred. These are desirable changes. It is
not easy to see why change of venue should not be possible in federal
practice as in the practice of most states, and these provisions may
prove helpful in working out a better answer to the always vexing
problem of venue in involved conspiracy cases.
Rule 4r. Time. This rule provides a uniform method of computing time. The most significant portion is subdivision ( c), which provides that the period of time for the doing of any act or the taking of
any proceeding is not affected by the expiration of a term of court, and
that the power of a court to do any act or take any step in a case pending
before it shall be unaffected by the expiration of a term of court.
Rule 42. Bail. This rule clarifies and simplifies the existing procedure. The chief features and changes are as follows:
(I) Subdivision (b) deals with commitment and bail for material
witnesses. It provides inter alia that the release of such witnesses may
be ordered whenever the court or commissioner finds that they have
been detained for an unreasonable length of time.
(2) Subdivision (d) provides a uniform rule governing the form
of bail and the types of security which may be required.
(3) Subdivision ( e) provides that every surety other than a corporate surety shall be justified by affidavit, and may be required to
describe in the affidavit the property in respect to which he proposes to
justify, and to set forth the encumbrances thereon, the number and
amount of other bonds and undertakings entered into by him and remaining undischarged, and all his other liabilities.
( 4) Subdivision ( f) distinguishes between discharge and remission
of a forfeiture, and makes express provision for both. In the event of a
breach of condition of a bond the declaration of forfeiture is to follow
automatically, subject to later discharge or remission. Subdivision (f)
(3) prescribes a simple enforcement procedure by motion, obviating the
necessity of an independent action. It is also provided that by entering
into a bond the obligators submit to the jurisdiction of the district court
and irrevocably appoint the clerk as their agent upon whom any papers
affecting their liability may be served.
Subdivisions ( d), ( e) and ( f) of the rule raise some serious questions. Some months ago a survey of the bail bond situation in the federal courts was conducted on behalf of the Department of Justice. Sev-
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eral million dollars on bail forfeitures and judgments were found to be
outstanding, about ninety percent of which appeared to be worthless.
The reasons why they were worthless have a direct 'bearing on the
procedure outlined in the proposed rule. An utter lack of uniformity
with respect to methods and standards for qualifying sureties was
found to exist. In the great majority of cases of uncollectibility the
system for qualifying had simply been inadequate. As the rule is now
drawn subdivision ( e) would leave the most material requirement to
the discretion of the officer taking the bond, which might well mean
going on with the old system of having the surety state his net worth.
The trouble with ·this is that it often turns out that he has no property
upon which an execution could be issued with any hope of recovery.
His property turns out to be.community property or subject to dower
rights, life estate or some other complication. If the property is unencumbered there is nothing to prevent him from encumbering or disposing of it before judgment. It is suggested, therefore, that subdivision ( d) be amended to require that the bond shall be on a form approved by the Attorney General which shall be uniform in all districts,
and include justification of sureties as a part of it; and that the word
"shall" be suostituted for the. word "may" in subdivision ( e) .28 It is
also suggested that .subdivision ( f) (3) be amended to provide that by
entering into a boz:id the obligators thereby create a lien on all their
property real and personal whether listed on justification or not, and
agree that the same will not be further encumbered or disposed of without permission of the .court until the bond is discharged.
.
Paragraph 4 of subdivision (f), dealing with remission, appears
similarly inadequate in the light of conditions disclosed by the survey.
Under this paragraph a surety can come in long after final judgment
and file a petition for remission. This possibility of remission should
be limited, if not to the time before final judgment, at least to some
reasonably short period. In one district, for example, the United States
Attorney's office followed a practice after terms of court of sending out
notices to sureties whose principals had wilfully defaulted, suggesting
that they come in and file petitions for remission. On the docket of that
same court hundreds of cases where forfeitures had been set aside on
condition that the surety pay twenty-five dollars were found, and even
this was not collected. Disinclination to penalize a surety for several
thousand dollars where, if the defendant had appeared and pleaded
28
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guilty his fine would have been much less, was an attitude not infrequently encountered.
Rule 43. Motions. This rule deals generally with motions and
provides that a motion may be supported by affidavit, thus removing
any objection to a "speaking'' motion.
Rule 44. Dismissal. This rule provides that the Attorney General
or the United States Attorney may file a dismissal of an indictment or
information, and that such dismissal shall be accompanied by a statement of reasons. Such a dismissal may not be filed during trial without
the consent of the defendant.
The requirement of a statement of reasons is open to question.
This should be discretionary with the government. The reason for dismissal may be the final judgment of the prosecutor that the evidence
is insufficient to convict. Perhaps it is planned to seek another indictment and it would be prejudicial to the government to disclose the
weakness of its former case. One can readily think of other reasons why
the government should not be required to state the reason for dismissal.
The imposition of thi~ requirement might have the effect either of
preventing the dismissal of indictments that should be dismiss.ed or encouraging the assignment of reasons which do not in fact constitute the
true or principal reason for dismissal.
Rule 47. Exceptions unnecessary. For all purposes for which an
exception has heretofore been necessary it is sufficient that a party, at
the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes
known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his
objection to the action of the court and the grounds therefot; and, if a
party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of
an objection does not thereafter prejudice him.
Rule 48. Harmless error and plain error. The chief features are
as follows:
(r) Superseding that portion of 28 United States Code, section
3 9 I, dealing with "technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not
affect the substantive rights of the parties" and that portion of I 8
United States Code, section 556, dealing with "any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the
defendant," subdivision (a) of the rule provides that any error, defect,
irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded.
( 2) Subdivision (b) states the doctrine of plain error by providing
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that plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
A minority of the Advisory Committee thinks that this rule relaxes
the duty of appellate courts to notice plain error, and they recommend
that the rule be made to read that "plain errors and defects affecting
substantial rights shall be noticed although they are not brought to the
attention of the court." 24
The remaining Rules 49-56, with the exception of Rule 50, relate
to more or less routine matters. Rule 50 relates to the application of
these rules, and exceptions to their application.
The draft as a whole is already provoking much discussion. Numerous criticisms and suggestions have already come from local associations
of bench and bar throughout the country. The stimulation of such
widespread discussion and consideration is indeed an essential feature
of the rule-making procedure. The Advisory Committee will have a
rich store of constructive suggestions to draw from when in its final
revision. Out of it all should develop a set of rules which will consti~te a great landmark in the administration of criminal law.
24
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